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Prevailing measures of relative poverty put an implausibly 
high weight on relative deprivation, such that measured 
poverty does not fall when all incomes grow at the same 
rate. This stems from the (implicit) assumption in past 
measures that very poor people incur a negligible cost 
of social inclusion. That assumption is inconsistent 
with evidence on the social roles of certain private 
expenditures in poor settings and with data on national 
poverty lines. The authors propose a new schedule of 
“weakly relative” lines that relax this assumption and  
estimate the implied poverty measures for 116 developing 
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countries. The authors find that there is more relative 
poverty than past estimates have suggested. In 2005, one 
half of the population of the developing world lived in 
relative poverty, half of whom were absolutely poor. The 
total number of relatively poor rose over 1981–2005, 
despite falling numbers of absolutely poor. With 
sustained economic growth, the incidence of relative 
poverty becomes less responsive to further growth. 
Slower progress against relative poverty can thus be seen 
as the “other side of the coin” to success against absolute 
poverty. 
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1.  Introduction 
The methods used to set poverty lines have differed radically between rich and poor 
countries. Poverty in the developing world is typically measured using absolute lines, which aim 
to have the same real value at different dates and places. Virtually all developing countries use 
such lines and, at the global level, the World Bank’s “$1-a-day” line is an absolute line, aiming 
to have the same purchasing power in different countries and at different dates.
2 By contrast, the 
more common practice in OECD countries is to use what we shall call “strongly relative poverty 
lines,” which are set at a constant proportion—typically 40-60%—of the (date and country-
specific) mean or median income.
3
This difference in how poverty lines are set matters greatly to the properties of the 
resulting poverty measures. The bulk of the literature has confined attention to measures that are 
homogeneous of degree zero between the mean and the poverty line for any given Lorenz curve.
  
4 
Using an absolute line, such a poverty measure automatically falls when all incomes grow at the 
same rate, while any measure based on strongly relative lines will be unchanged.
5 So it is hardly 
surprising that this choice has been found to matter greatly to assessments of how poverty is 
changing over time,
6 as well as to cross-sectional poverty comparisons.
7
                                                 
2   The original “$1-a-day” was proposed by Ravallion et al. (1991) in a background paper for World Bank 
(1990); the latest update is Ravallion et al. (2008). 
3   Examples for OECD countries include Smeeding et al. (1990), Atkinson (1998), Saunders and Smeeding 
(2002), Fouarge and Layte (2005), Eurostat (2005), Nolan (2007) and OECD (2008, Chapter 5). An exception is the 
official poverty line for the US, which is three times the cost of a subsistence food basket, as first proposed by 
Orshansky (1963). However, there has been considerable dissatisfaction with this line; for a review of the debates 
see Blank (2008). There has been some debate about whether the poverty measure should be anchored to the mean 
or the median (Saunders and Smeeding, 2002; Easton, 2002; de Mesnard, 2007); poverty lines set as a constant 
proportion of the median can have perverse properties when the Lorenz curve shifts (as shown by de Mesnard, 
2007). This is a legitimate concern but is not central to the present paper.  
4   This holds for the headcount index, poverty gap index, and indeed the entire class of Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (1984) measures, as well as the Watts index and many other measures. Note that the two types of 
measures are typically calculated on the same distribution of relative incomes, i.e., the same Lorenz curve. 
5   Note also that, for a given Lorenz curve, the median is directly proportional to the mean. Thus this strong 
relativity property also holds when the poverty line is a fixed proportion of the median.  
6   For example, the UNDP (2005, Box 3) (based on Nolan et al., 2005) showed how relative poverty measures 
for Ireland were rising despite higher absolute living standards for the poor; thus the UNDP (p. 334) warns that: 
“…when economic conditions change rapidly, relative poverty measures do not always present a complete picture of 
the ways that economic change affects people’s lives.” In another example, Easton (2002) argued that relative 
measures for New Zealand were deceptive in showed falling poverty despite lower levels of living for the poor.      
7   For example, OECD (2008, Chapter 5) reports the same poverty rate for the US as Mexico. In another 
example, the urban poverty line proposed by Osberg and Xu (2008) for China (set at half the median) is 2.4 times 
their rural line, or 1.7 times when deflated by the Ravallion and Chen (2007) absolute lines. The Osberg-Xu method 
suggests little difference in poverty incidence between urban and rural China, while the Ravallion-Chen method 
indicates far higher poverty measures in rural China.   
   3 
Using an absolute line, any two people with the same purchasing power over 
commodities, but living in different countries, are treated the same way, in that both are either 
poor or not poor. However, relative poverty measures only treat them the same way if the two 
countries have the same mean income. Two main arguments can be identified in support of the 
use of relative lines.
8 The first views poverty lines as money-metrics of utility and claims that 
people attach value to their income relative to the mean in their country of residence. Since this 
presumes that relative income is a source of utility it can be described as “welfarist.” While the 
idea that utility anchors poverty lines is not common in applied work, it is consistent with a 
strand of the literature on welfare measurement in economics whereby cost-of-living indices and 
equivalence scales are anchored to some reference level of utility.
9
The second (“non-welfarist”) argument is more common in practice. Essentially this says 
that poverty lines should allow for differences in the cost of social inclusion, which can be 
defined as the expenditure needed to cover certain commodities that are deemed to have a role in 
assuring that a person can participate with dignity in customary social and economic activities.
  
10
                                                 
8   A third justification sometimes heard is that strongly relative measures remove the effects of cross-country 
differences in survey methods and measurement practices; see, for example, UNDP (2005, Box 3). This only holds 
for distribution-neutral differences and if one accepts the following welfare justifications for strongly relative 
measures; if they are not accepted then it is unclear in what sense strongly relative lines are comparable across 
countries, given that their real values are likely to vary so much. The data justification is thus secondary. 
9   On the welfarist interpretation of a poverty line as a point on the consumer’s cost function corresponding to 
a reference level of utility see Blackorby and Donaldson (1987). For a broader overview of economic approaches to 
welfare measurement see Slesnick (1998).  
10   It can be granted that “social inclusion” is a broader concept than this definition allows, and may well 
require more than commodities, including, for example, freedom from discrimination according to gender or 
ethnicity. However, the concern here is with the measurement of poverty in terms of command over commodities. 
 
This argument does not rest on the view that social inclusion is a (direct or indirect) source of 
utility. Rather it is seen as a desired capability for not being deemed “poor” in a specific context. 
The most influential exponent of this line of argument has clearly been Sen (1983, 1985), who 
argued that it is a person’s capabilities that should be seen as absolute; in the context of poverty 
measurement, this means that “…an absolute approach in the space of capabilities translates into 
a relative approach in the space of commodities” (Sen, 1983, p. 168). Relative poverty in the 
income space is then seen as the logical implication of absolute poverty in the capability space. 
If, additionally, the cost of social inclusion is directly proportional to mean income in the country 
of residence then one can justify a strongly relative poverty line.   4 
Both the welfarist and non-welfarist arguments can claim some support from past 
thinking and evidence. The idea that people care about relative income has a long history. It is 
sometimes called the theory of relative deprivation (RD), following Runciman (1966), although 
economists often refer to it as the “relative income hypothesis,” following Duesenberry (1949). 
Some version of RD has often been invoked to explain observed behavior.
11 While early 
discussions lacked evidence on the existence of RD effects, there is now a body of supportive 
evidence from both observational studies and experiments, though mainly in developed-country 
settings. Experiments have suggested that relative position matters to behavior.
12 Regressions for 
self-reported “satisfaction with life” or perceived economic welfare have also found results 
broadly consistent with the idea of RD.
13
The idea that certain socially-specific expenditures can be deemed essential for social 
inclusion is also long-standing. Famously, 
 There has been much less research on whether very 
poor people care about RD; in one of the few studies, Ravallion and Lokshin (2007) found 
evidence for Malawi that, for very poor people, the positive externalities from having better-off 
friends and neighbors outweighed the negative externalities through RD, although this pattern 
reversed at higher income levels.  
Adam Smith (1776, Book 5, Chapter 2, Article 4) 
pointed to the social-inclusion role of a linen shirt in eighteenth century Europe: 
“A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans 
lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the 
greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a 
linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty 
which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.” 
 
The social roles of certain forms of consumption have also been noted from research in poor 
countries. Anthropologists have pointed to the social roles played by festivals, celebrations and 
communal feasts; see, for example, Geertz (1976) and Fuller (1999, Chapter 6). Rao (2002) 
documents the importance of celebrations to maintaining the social networks that are crucial to 
coping with poverty in rural India. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) report seemingly high 
expenditures on celebrations and festivals by very poor people in survey data for a number of 
                                                 
11   Easterlin (1974) used RD to explain why economic growth in the US has had little effect on the proportion 
of people who think they are happy. Other examples of the use of relativism to explain behavior can be found in 
Frank (1997), Oswald (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Walker and Smith (2001) and Hopkins (2008). 
12   See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Alpizar et al (2005).  
13   Examples include van de Stadt et al., (1985), Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998), 
Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), Ravallion and Lokshin (2002, 2007), McBride (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004), Kingdon and Knight (2007), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005) and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009).    5 
developing countries. In Yemen, participants at “qat sessions” discuss local economic and social 
affairs while chewing this mild stimulant; these sessions serve an important social role—and no 
less so for poor people—such that “refusing to take qat is tantamount to accepting ostracisation” 
(Milanovic, 2008, p.684). Clothing can also serve a social role. Friedman (1990) describes how 
poor Congolese acquired clothing with a conspicuous “designer label,” which he interpreted as 
status-seeking behavior. A field experiment by van Kempen (2004) revealed that poor people in 
Bolivia were willing to pay a premium for a designer label, which (he argues) serves as a 
symbolic expression of social identity for the poor (van Kempen, 2004, p.222).
14
One can find antecedents to this idea in the literature. Research on social-subjective 
poverty lines—poverty lines based on responses to survey questions concerning the “minimum 
income to make ends meet” or perceived consumption adequacy
   
In the light of such observations there is a case for asking what a global relative poverty 
measure for the developing world might look like, analogous to the widely cited “$1-a-day” 
absolute measures. The purpose of this paper is to provide such a poverty measure. However, we 
argue that neither the welfarist nor capabilities-based arguments above are fully convincing as 
justifications for strongly relative lines. We argue that the welfarist justification requires an 
implausibly high weight on relative position and the non-welfarist, capability-based, justification 
makes the implausible assumption that the cost of inclusion goes to zero in the limit as a person 
becomes very poor.  
We propose instead that poverty measures should satisfy the following weak relativity 
axiom (WRA): If all incomes increase (decrease) by the same proportion then an aggregate 
poverty measure must fall (rise). In any standard poverty measure this will be satisfied as long as 
the elasticity of the poverty line to the mean does not exceed unity. 
15—has pointed to mean-income 
elasticities of the poverty line less than unity.
16
                                                 
14   For a more general discussion of the social-symbolic roles that consumption can play see Khalil (2000). 
15   See Groedhart et al. (1977), Kapteyn, Kooreman and Willemse (1988) and Pradhan and Ravallion (2000).   
16   Hagenaars and van Praag (1985) estimate an elasticity of 0.51 for eight European countries. Kilpatrick 
(1973) estimated an elasticity of about 0.6 for subjective poverty lines in the US.      
 The proposals made by the 1995 panel of the 
National Research Council (NRC) for revising the official poverty line of the US would also be 
likely to generate poverty lines with a positive (though inter-temporally variable) elasticity less   6 
than unity.
17 Each of these approaches can be questioned.
18
Past global poverty measures have been anchored to national poverty lines converted to 
international $’s at purchasing power parity (PPP).  The original “$1-a-day” line was an average 
for low-income countries (Ravallion et al., 1991). Atkinson and Bourguignon (AB) (2001) 
proposed a schedule of global poverty lines also calibrated to national lines. These were hybrid 
lines, being absolute for low-income countries (set at the $1-a-day line) and strongly relative for 
middle income and developed countries.
 However, most importantly for the 
present paper, these approaches are not operational for global poverty measurement. We need a 
schedule of weakly relative poverty lines with global applicability. 
19
An exclusive focus on absolute poverty is justified if one accepts two axioms: subgroup 
additivity and subgroup anonymity (Ravallion, 2008). The first says that aggregate poverty is the 
sum of all individual levels of poverty in the population, implying that if poverty increases in any 
subgroup, and does not change for any other group, then aggregate poverty must increase.
 We follow the same approach of using national 
poverty lines to identify our proposed schedule of weakly relative poverty lines.  
The following section proposes our new measures of “weakly relative poverty.” Section 3 
discusses the identification assumptions, while section 4 describes key features of the data. 
Section 5 calibrates the parameters of our poverty lines to the observed relationship across 
countries between national poverty lines and mean consumption. Section 6 presents our 
estimates of the new measures of relative poverty.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Revisiting the theory of relative poverty lines 
20 The 
practice of poverty measurement has largely been confined to such additive measures.
21
                                                 
17   The panel recommended that US poverty lines should be anchored to median expenditures on food, 
clothing and shelter (Citro and Michael, 1995). Given that these goods tend to be necessities, they will have an 
elasticity with respect to mean income less than unity.   
18   For example, in the case of the proposal by the NRC panel it is unclear why concerns about relative poverty 
would apply only to necessities; it would seem more natural to assume that the income gradient in a poverty line 
stems from social inclusion needs that go beyond necessities in a country such as the US. 
19   Chen and Ravallion (2001, 2004) implemented a slight variation on the AB lines but their lines were still 
strongly relative above a critical level of consumption. 
20   This is the “subgroup monotonicity axiom” of Foster and Shorrocks (1991).  
21   Examples include the widely used Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class of measures. Atkinson (1987) 
reviews other additive measures in the literature. Additivity is not universally accepted; see the discussion in Foster 
and Sen (1997); Sen ’s (1976) poverty measure is an example of a not additive. 
  Less 
attention has been paid to subgroup anonymity, which says that moving a person between   7 
groups, with no absolute loss to own consumption, cannot increase aggregate poverty. This 
precludes the possibility that a person’s poverty depends on her income relative to her group.  
As discussed in the introduction, both welfarist and non-welfarist arguments can be made 
for relaxing anonymity. The following discussion will show how weakly relative poverty lines 
can be derived consistently with both approaches.  
The welfarist interpretation argues that poverty should be seen as absolute in the space of 
“welfare,” rather than in the consumption or income space, and that welfare depends (positively) 
on both own income and relative income—own income relative to mean income in the country 
of residence.
22
) / , ( M Z Z V V =
 It follows that for a poverty line to be a money-metric of welfare it must be an 
increasing function of mean income. To see this more formally, suppose that welfare depends on 
“own income,” Y, and “relative income,” Y/M, where M is the mean for the country of residence. 
Welfare is V(Y, Y/M), which is taken to be smoothly non-decreasing in both Y and Y/M. The 
poverty line in income space is denoted Z and is defined implicitly by: 
                    (1) 
where V  is the fixed poverty line in the welfare space. Letting η denote the elasticity of Z with 
respect to M, it is readily verified that: 
   
MRS M    +   
  =  
. 1
1
η   ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤η              (2) 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution of relative income for own income 
( M Y Y V V MRS / / = ), interpretable as the weight on own income divided by that on relative 
income. If η=0 then relative income does not matter (its weight is zero and so the MRS goes to 
infinity), while η=1 implies that only relative income matters (zero weight on own income).   
Thus we can state the following result: 
Proposition 1: Welfarist poverty lines satisfy the Weak Relativity Axiom as long as both 
own income and relative income are valued positively. 
Notice that the elasticity of the poverty line (η) will only rise with the mean if the weight 
attached to relative income rises sufficiently. More precisely, η will be increasing in M if (and 
only if) the elasticity of the MRS with respect to M is less than -1.   
                                                 
22   One can certainly question whether this is the appropriate reference group for relativist comparisons at the 
individual level; see, for example, the discussion of reference groups in Ravallion and Lokshin (2007) and 
references therein. However, it is the relevant group for the problem at hand of measuring global poverty.   8 
The utility of relative income has not, however, been the main argument made for relative 
poverty lines. Rather, the case has been seen to rest on the view that there are certain demands on 
income that are socially determined and that a person is absolutely deprived if those demands 
cannot be met in a specific social context.  
Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) proposed a neat way of implementing this idea for the 
purpose of measuring global poverty. They postulated two key capabilities: physical survival and 
social inclusion. The former is the capability of being adequately nourished and clothed for 
meeting the physical needs of survival and normal activities. On top of this, a person must also 
satisfy certain social inclusion needs, which are assumed to be directly proportional to mean 
consumption in the country of residence. Each capability has a corresponding poverty line, 
giving the absolute and relative lines. The AB proposal is that one should only be deemed “not 
poor” if one is neither absolutely poor nor relatively poor. Letting 
* Z  be the minimum 
expenditure needed to assure that basic consumption needs are met, measured at purchasing 
power parity (PPP), the AB poverty line for country i is: 




i kM Z Z =   ) 1 0 ( < < k             (3) 
There are two unknown parameters in (3), 
* Z  and k. AB proposed that 
* Z  should be set at the 
World Bank’s “$1-a-day” line, on the grounds that this can be considered a reasonably lower 
bound, since it is anchored to the poverty lines found in the poorest countries (Ravallion et al., 
1991). AB then argued that the value of k could also be based on national poverty lines above 
those found in the poorest countries, by studying how those lines vary with man consumption in 
the original data base of poverty lines used by Ravallion et al. (1991) to set the “$1-a-day” line. 
By visual inspection of the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set on national poverty lines at 1985 PPP, 
Atkinson and Bourguignon set k=0.37. Subsequently, Chen and Ravallion (2001) found that 
k=1/3 gave a better fit with the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set at 1993 PPP.     
However, the AB line fails the WRA in that it has an elasticity of unity for all countries 
with k Z Mi /
* > . This is surely implausible. The idea that distribution-neutral growth has no 
impact on the extent of poverty in new middle-income countries such as China would surely be 
very hard to accept (not least, we would conjecture, in China). The violation of the WEA stems 
from the seemingly implausible assumption that the cost of social inclusion is directly   9 
proportional to the mean.  While the costs of social-inclusion may be very low for very poor 
people, they are unlikely to vanish in the limit.  
To address this concern, while preserving the neatness of the AB solution, we propose the 
following “generalized AB poverty line”: 
) , max(
*
i kM Z Z + = α               (4) 
This adds a third parameter,  0 ≥ α , which is the lower bound to social-inclusion needs. The 
elasticity is strictly less than unity for  0 > α . We can thus state: 
Proposition 2: The generalized Atkinson-Bourguignon poverty lines satisfy the Weak 
Relativity Axiom as long as the cost of social inclusion has a positive lower bound.  
 
3.  Identification from national poverty lines   
The original “$1-a-day” line was chosen to be representative of the national poverty lines 
found in the poorest countries (Ravallion, et al., 1991), and this principle has guided subsequent 
updates (Chen and Ravallion, 2001; Ravallion et al., 2009). We follow Atkinson and 
Bourguignon (2001) and Chen and Ravallion (2001) in also calibrating the whole schedule of 
relative poverty lines to data on how national poverty lines vary across countries. In other words, 
we assume that the differences in the real value of poverty lines between countries at different 
levels of mean consumption reflect differences in either the value attached to relative deprivation 
(following the welfarist approach outlined above) or differences in the costs of social inclusion 
needs (following the non-welfarist approach). Our empirical implementation makes the further 
assumption that our global (weakly) relative poverty lines change over time consistently with the 
cross-sectional variation seen between countries. This section reviews the arguments that can be 
made for and against these identifying assumptions.  
From a welfarist perspective, it is plausible that absolute consumption needs dominate 
subjective welfare at very low levels of consumption but that, as countries become richer, people 
attach higher value to relative position, and there are both theoretical and empirical arguments 
that can be used to support that view (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2007; Ravallion, 2008). Similarly, 
it is plausible that perceptions of what it means to be socially excluded evolve with the overall 
level of economic development.    10 
The issue here is whether these differences will be reflected in national poverty lines. 
Such lines must invariably pass a test of their social relevance in the specific country context.
23
The apparent stickiness of real national poverty lines over time sits uncomfortably with 
this view. While relative poverty lines used in OECD countries and by Eurostat are automatically 
adjusted over time in line with the changes in the mean (or median), it does not appear to be 
common to see official poverty lines in growing developing economies being revised upwards in 
real terms. However, it is not necessarily inconsistent with our approach to find that the real level 
of the poverty line is resistant to change in some growing economies. For one thing, it may well 
be the case that a (positive) minimum aggregate income gain to a low-income country is needed 
before upward pressure on the poverty line emerges; in fact that is implied by our weakly relative 
poverty lines based on equation (4). It must also be acknowledged that there can be a strong 
 
A poverty line that is too frugal by the standards of society will no doubt be seen as such by 
those constructing that line, and so be rejected. Similarly, a line that is too generous will not be 
easily accepted either. As argued by Ravallion (1998, 2008b), the very process of setting a 
national poverty line entails enumerable choices that appear to be guided in large part by a desire 
for the line to be accepted in the specific context.  
This argument would seem more plausible for the capabilities-based approach than the 
welfarist approach based on relative deprivation. Some set of “capabilities” is an (implicit or 
explicit) foundation for most poverty lines used in practice. Nutritional needs for good health and 
normal activities are commonly identified, although there is considerable discretion in terms of 
how such needs are mapped into the consumption space. In a poor country, it is socially 
acceptable, and common, to allow a poverty line to attain almost all of the stipulated nutritional 
requirements (2100 calories per day, say) with one or two starchy food staples, while in a 
middle-income or rich country the stipulated diet is far more diverse (and palatable). Allowances 
for non-food consumption introduce even more discretion, and it seems plausible that ideas about 
social inclusion needs in specific societies would come to play an important role, particularly 
(but not only) for the non-food allowances. It would hardly seem credible that the national 
poverty lines that emerge from the choices made in their calibration would not come to reflect 
prevailing views about what poverty means in the specific context.  
                                                 
23   This is no less true of the poverty lines constructed for World Bank Poverty Assessments, which emerge out 
of close collaboration between the technical team (often including local statistical staff and academics) and the 
government of the country concerned.   11 
political resistance to revising the poverty line.
24
Second, we use the PPP of individual consumption by households from the latest (2005) 
round of the International Comparison Program (ICP) (World Bank, 2008). This is the most 
 The fact that actual poverty lines in practice are 
sticky is not a compelling reason against allowing them to vary for the purposes of measuring 
global relative poverty. 
There are, of course, random differences in national lines at given mean consumption or 
income that one would not want to attach any normative significance to in measuring global 
poverty. The fact that there is political resistance to revising real poverty lines upwards, and that 
they are set at different times in different countries, will create random differences in the poverty 
lines found at given current mean consumption. There are also differences in methodologies used 
to set poverty lines in practice (as discussed in Ravallion et al., 2009). The issue here is whether 
there is a systematic pattern in the conditional mean national poverty line (conditional on mean 
consumption), such that it has a very low gradient amongst poor countries but then rises with 
mean consumption. Such a pattern was first found in national poverty lines by Ravallion et al. 
(1991) and we will confirm below that it is also evident in new data on national lines.  
 
4.  Data for measuring global relative poverty 
In measuring relative poverty in the developing world we shall draw on three new data 
sources. The first is a new compilation of national poverty lines documented in Ravallion, Chen 
and Sangraula (RCS) (2009). This exploits the new analytic work on poverty at country level that 
has been done since 1990, when Ravallion et al. (1991) collected the data on national poverty 
lines used for setting the “$1-a-day” line (and by AB for setting their encompassing line). Much 
of the new work has been done under the World Bank’s program of country Poverty Assessments 
and the program of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers by national governments, often with 
assistance from the Bank or other governments or international agencies. There were very few of 
these studies available in 1990, but they have now been done for some 100 developing countries. 
Almost all include estimates of national poverty lines.  
                                                 
24   See, for example, the discussion in Blank (2008) on why the official poverty line in the US has not been 
updated, despite considerable dissatisfaction with the old line, proposed in 1963 and only updated for inflation since. 
Similarly, the poverty line in China has not been revised upwards in real terms for over 20 years, despite a four-fold 
increase in mean income. This has led many observers to question the relevance of their poverty lines to current 
conditions; see, for example, Osberg and Xu (2008). The government of China is in the process of revising upwards 
the country’s official poverty lines. The Planning Commission of the Government of India is also revisiting the 
country’s official poverty line.   12 
ambitious round to date of the ICP and entailed a substantial improvement in data quality for 
estimating PPP’s.  For the purpose of measuring global poverty, an important feature of the 2005 
ICP is that it did a much better job of collecting the prices needed to measure living costs. 
Reliable price surveys are quite difficult to do, particularly in poor countries where non-traded 
goods are a large share of spending. The new surveys done for the 2005 ICP used far more 
elaborate product descriptions to help identify comparable goods, so that we do not make the 
mistake of judging people to be better off because they consume lower quality (and hence 
cheaper) goods. However, there are also a number of concerns about the 2005 ICP round in this 
context.
25 These include a likely “urban bias” in the price surveys for some countries and the fact 
that the ICP is designed for comparing national accounts aggregates rather than poverty 
measurement.
26
Third, we use our own compilation of 675 household surveys for 115 countries; the latest 
survey rounds cover a total of 1.23 million randomly sampled households. Chen and Ravallion 
(2008a) provide a listing of the countries and years; further details can be found in the 
  
PovcalNet 
site. The surveys were mostly done by governmental statistics offices. We have estimated all 
poverty measures from the primary (unit record or specially commissioned tabulations) survey 
data. Households are ranked by either consumption or income per person; we have preferred 
consumption, which is available for about 60% of the surveys. The distributions are weighted by 
household size and sample expansion factors. Thus our poverty counts give the number of people 
living in households with per capita consumption or income below the poverty line. Interpolation 
methods (described in Chen and Ravallion, 2004, 2008) are used to line up the survey-based 
estimates with the reference years at three-yearly intervals over 1981-2005.  
Figure 1 plots the national poverty lines for developing countries against private 
consumption per capita from the National Accounts, both converted to international $’s using the 
2005 household consumption PPP from the ICP. We see that the national poverty line tends to 
rise with mean consumption, which we call the “economic gradient.” The least squares estimate 
of the elasticity of Z to M is 0.655 (with a t-ratio of 13.68, based on a robust standard error).
27
                                                 
25   For an overview of the issues in constructing PPPs see Deaton and Heston (2008). On the impacts of some 
of the methodological choices on global poverty measures see Ackland et al. (2008). 
26   China is an important example of this urban bias; for further discussion and a description of how we have 
attempted to correct for this bias see Chen and Ravallion (2008b).  
27   The estimate is also robust to outliers; a median quantile regression gave 0.647 (t=9.57). 
 
This is significantly less than unity (t=7.21). So these data are not consistent with strongly   13 
relative poverty in developing countries, but they are consistent with the weakly-relative 
poverty—a national poverty line that rises with mean consumption, but with an elasticity less 
than unity.   
However, Figure 1 also suggests that the economic gradient only emerges once mean 
consumption is above a critical level. Figure 1 gives a nonparametric regression of the national 
poverty lines against log mean consumption.
28
* Z
 So the same pattern found by Ravallion et al. 
(1991) using their compilations of national poverty lines for the 1980s is evident in Figure 1, 
with the poverty line rising with mean consumption, but with a low elasticity initially.  
The data in Figure 1 will be used in the following section to calibrate our proposed 
schedule of weakly relative poverty lines.  
 
5.  Empirical implementation and implications 
Recall that there are three parameters to our schedule of relative poverty lines in (4), 
namely  , α  and k. We set these to $1.25 a day, $0.60 a day and 1/3 respectively, giving the 
following schedule of relative poverty lines (in $’s per day at the 2005 PPP for household 
consumption): 
  ] 3 / , 65 . 0 max[$ 60 . 0 $ ] 3 / 60 . 0 $ , 25 . 1 max[$ i i i M M Z + = + ≡     (5) 
The value of 
* ˆ Z =$1.25 a day is the international poverty line proposed by RCS, which is the 
average poverty line amongst the poorest 15 countries (although the line is quite robust to small 
changes in the number of countries, as shown by RCS). A visual inspection of the scatter plot in 
Figure 1 suggests that a positive slope starts to emerge at a log of monthly consumption of 
around 4, corresponding to about $2 a day, and that the gradient is about one-in-three. The 
parameter choices in (5) were confirmed econometrically, using a suitably constrained version of 
Hansen’s (2002) method for estimating a piece-wise linear (“threshold”) model. (The variation 
on Hansen’s model is that, in our case, the slope of the lower linear segment is constrained to be 
zero and there is no potential discontinuity at the threshold.) This gave 
* ˆ Z =$1.23 (t=6.36) and 
325 . 0 ˆ = k  (t=12.70).
 29
                                                 
28   We use STATA’s Locally Weighted Scatter Plot Smoothing method with the default bandwidth (0.8).  
29   By this method one essentially estimates (1) for each possible value of consumption in the data 
and picks the value that minimizes the residual sum of squares The variation on Hansen’s model is that, in 
our case, the slope of the lower linear segment is constrained to be zero and there is no potential 
discontinuity at the threshold. We are grateful to Michael Lokshin for programming Hansen’s method. 
    14 
We can also provide a number of other statistical tests that confirm this choice. There is a 
high correlation between the poverty lines implied by (5) for our sample and the nonparametric 
regression function in Figure 1 (r=0.994) as well as with the data on national poverty lines 
(r=0.836). Equation (5) also outperforms a wide range of smooth parametric functional forms. 
Indeed, remarkably, the standard error in predicting the national lines is actually lower using 
equation (5) than the nonparametric regression in Figure 1; the standard deviation of the error is 
$1.19 for our poverty lines versus $1.20 for the fitted values using the smoothness parameter for 
the regression in Figure 1. (Of course, a sufficiently less smooth nonparametric regression would 
do better than our piece-wise linear model.) There is no correlation between the errors in 
predicting the national poverty lines using (5) and the fitted values of the nonparametric 
regression in Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient is 0.02). As a further test, neither the fitted 
values from the nonparametric regression in Figure 1 nor a cubic polynomial in M were 
significant when added to a regression of the national poverty lines on Z  given by (5).
30
The bold unbroken line in Figure 2 gives our weakly-relative schedule in (5). In our data 
set of national poverty lines, 
   
i Z  varies from $1.25 a day to $8 a day.
31
95 . 1 $ < M
 The fact that the rising 
portion of our poverty lines in (5) is not homogeneous immediately implies that the elasticity of 
the poverty line to mean consumption is below unity throughout (the elasticity goes to unity in 
the limit, as consumption goes to infinity). The elasticity is zero at   and then rises 
from 0.5 to close to 1.0 over the sample range. The consumption level at which the kink (above 
which the poverty line rises with the mean) occurred in the Chen Ravallion (2001) version of the 
AB schedule of relative poverty lines is appreciably higher than for our new schedule. For the 
Chen and Ravallion (2001) relative lines the kink was at a consumption level of $3.24 per day at 
1993 PPP, while the new schedule of relative poverty lines in equation (5) has a kink at $1.95 a 
day at 2005 PPP.  If we had instead chosen  ) 3 / , 25 . 1 max($ i M  as the relative poverty line at 
2005 PPP, the kink would be at a consumption level of $3.75 a day instead of $1.95. This reflects 
                                                 
30   The joint F test of the null that the three parameters in the cubic function of M are all zero in the regression 
of national poverty lines on Z given by equation (5) gave F(3,69)=0.14 (prob.=0.93) while the t-test on the 
coefficient on the fitted values when added to the same regression was t=0.44.  
31   There are three special cases: China, India and Indonesia. For these countries, we have separate rural and 
urban distribution data from 1981 to 2005. In addition, for China and India we have separate rural and urban CPI 
over time. We treat the relative poverty line based on (5) as the national line for India and Indonesia, and then back 
out the rural and urban poverty lines using the urban-rural differentials in national lines. For China, the 2005 PPP is 
an urban PPP, so we set the urban relative poverty line as the national line, and adjust the rural relative poverty line 
down according to the ratio of urban to rural poverty lines (following Chen and Ravallion 2008b).   15 
the fact that our weakly relative measures allow  0 > α , thus shifting up the schedule (Figure 2). 
There are 18 countries with M in the interval ($1.95, $3.75), i.e., there are an extra 18 countries 
in the segment where the absolute line is no longer binding.      
So our new data on national poverty lines suggest that relative poverty is a more 
prominent concern than past work indicated. This echoes our finding that the overall elasticity of 
the poverty line to the mean in our sample is quite high—less than unity but similar to some past 
estimates for developed countries. 
What might we expect on a priori grounds about the trends over time in weakly relative 
poverty, as compared to absolute poverty? That will depend in part on how the distribution of 
relative incomes evolves. As a stylized fact, there is no correlation across countries between rates 
of growth and rates of change in a standard measure of relative inequality.
32 In other words, 
amongst developing countries, economic growth tends to be distribution-neutral on average.
33
) ( i i Z F
 
This motivates a consideration of distribution-neutral growth as a benchmark case. To see how 
the trend rates of reduction in the poverty rate will differ using our relative poverty measure 
under distribution-neutral growth, let   denote the proportion of the population of country i 
living below our weakly relative poverty line, while  ) (
* Z Fi  is the corresponding poverty rate 
using the absolute line. Under a distribution-neutral growth process it is readily verified that the 
















































=             (6.2) 
Here the partial elasticities,  0 ln / ) ( ln < ∂ ∂ i i i M Z F  and  0 ln / ) ( ln
* < ∂ ∂ i i M Z F , hold both  i Z  
and the Lorenz curve constant. Since our relative poverty measures satisfy the WRA, the relative 
poverty rate will fall as long as the growth rate ( dt M d i / ln ) is positive.  The absolute poverty 
rate will also fall with positive growth. Whether or not the relative poverty measure falls more 
                                                 
32   Ferreira and Ravallion (2009) provide an overview of the evidence on this stylized fact.  
33   Growth can be distribution neutral within all countries, but not distribution neutral in the world as a whole, 
depending on how the rates of growth vary with initial mean incomes. Ravallion (2009) shows that the overall 
growth process in the developing world has not been distribution-neutral. 
34   We exploit the fact that  i i i i i M Z Z F L / )) ( ( = ′  where L is the Lorenz curve. Thus  ) ( i i Z F  is homogeneous of 
degree zero in  i Z  and  i M , holding constant the Lorenz curve (and hence the function  (.) i L′ ).   16 
slowly than the absolute measure depends on the relative size of the partial elasticities. This is an 
empirical issue. Ravallion (2009) shows that, for the developing world as a whole, the (absolute) 
elasticity falls monotonically as the poverty line increases over the range $0.75 to $13 a day, 
certainly encompassing the range of our relative poverty lines. Then relative poverty will fall at a 
slower rate than absolute poverty.  Furthermore, as absolute poverty falls with economic growth 
the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to the mean ( i i M d Z d ln / ln ) increases while the 
partial elasticity ( 0 ln / ) ( ln < ∂ ∂ i i i M Z F ) tends to fall. Thus the rate of reduction in relative 
poverty will tend to fall as the level of absolute poverty falls. With population growth, after some 
point, the numbers of relatively poor will be rising, while the numbers of absolutely poor are 
falling. As we will see, this prediction is confirmed by our estimates. 
 
6.  Poverty measures for the developing world  
We present our results for 1981-2005 at three yearly intervals. Table 1 give our estimates 
of the absolute poverty measures for the $1.25 a day line at 2005 PPP for the developing world 
as a whole and the largest regions in terms of the number of poor.
35 We find that 25 percent of 
the population of the developing world, 1.4 billion people, lived below $1.25 a day in 2005. 
Twenty-five years earlier (in 1981) the percentage was 52%. This rate of progress was sufficient 
to bring the count of the number of poor down from 1.9 billion to 1.4 billion. However, progress 
was highly uneven across regions, with dramatic declines in the poverty count for East Asia, but 
with much less progress in other regions, and rising numbers of absolutely poor in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (though with some sign of progress in the late 1990s).
36
The corresponding relative measures are found in Table 2. The top panel gives the mean 
poverty lines by region. (The mean lines do not figure in the analysis but are still of interest.) In 
all regions and all years, the mean is above $38 per month ($1.25 a day), implying that the 
relative poverty line is generally dominant. (The $1.25 line is binding for about 20% of countries 
and years.) In 2005, the inter-regional differences in relative poverty lines range from $47 per 
month in Sub-Saharan Africa to $151 per month in Latin America. The relative poverty lines rise 
over time with economic growth; in East Asia the average line goes from about $40 per month in 
1981 to over $60 per month in 2005. 
  
                                                 
35   We exclude the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These account for only 2.1% 
of the absolute poverty count (and 10.4% of the relative poverty count). 
36   For further discussion see Chen and Ravallion (2008a).   17 
The next two panels of Table 2 give the percentages below the line and numbers of poor. 
Through most of the 1990s, about half of the population of the developing world was relatively 
poor. The proportion fell over time, from 63% in 1981 to 53% in 1990 and 47% in 2005. But the 
decline was not continual; the aggregate incidence of relative poverty rose slightly in both the 
late 1980s and late 1990s. The trend rate of decline over the period as a whole is -0.56 
percentage points per year (with a standard error of 0.10). Projecting this trend rate of decline 
over 1981-2005 forward to 2015, the proportion living in relative poverty would be 40.5% 
(standard error=2.4%). 
  The trend decline in the incidence of relative poverty has not been sufficient to reduce the 
number of poor by this measure, which rose from 2.3 billion to 2.6 billion over 1981-2005 
(Table 2). The turning point appears to be around 1987.  
Figure 3 shows the simultaneous rise in relative poverty and fall in absolute poverty. As 
one would expect, the proportion of the relatively poor that are also absolutely poor has fallen 
over time, given economic growth. In 1981, 82% of the relatively poor were absolutely poor; by 
2005 the proportion had fallen to 53%. 
  South Asia saw the largest absolute increase in the number of relatively poor. East Asia  
experienced a falling count of both the absolutely poor and the relatively poor (though with a 
more rapid pace of progress against absolute poverty). Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we see 
changes in the regional profile of poverty, although it is notable that the two regions with the 
highest incidence of absolute poverty also have the highest relative poverty rate. In 2005, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) had the highest incidence of absolute poverty, with South Asia in second 
place (Table 1), but South Asia emerges as the region with the highest incidence of relative 
poverty (Table 2), with SSA second. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) had the third 
highest relative poverty incidence, but came fourth in absolute poverty. As expected, the share of 
global poverty in LAC rises from 3.3% to 9.6%. The largest decline in share is for SSA, which 
falls from 28.4% to 16.4%; South Asia’s share falls from 43.3% to 36.1%.  
  Also comparing Tables 1 and 2, we find that the aggregate headcount index of relative 
poverty for 2005 is 1.88 times the aggregate index of absolute poverty; in 2002, the ratio was 
1.63. It is of interest to compare these numbers to the corresponding ratios from Chen and 
Ravallion (2004), using their parameterization of the Atkinson-Bourguignon relative poverty 
lines. For the latest year in the Chen-Ravallion series (2001) the aggregate measure of relative   18 
poverty was 1.36 times the aggregate measure of absolute poverty. This upward revision in the 
extent of poverty reflects the aforementioned fact that our weakly relative measures imply that 
the economic gradient in poverty lines emerges at a lower level than was found using the AB 
poverty lines calibrated on the Ravallion et al. (1991) data set.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
While we can accept that people care about their relative position in society (at least 
above some level of living) it is very hard to accept that they only care about relative income. 
And while one can agree that certain goods have a social role it is hard to accept that the 
expenditure required to attain those goods is negligibly small for very poor people; recalling 
Adam Smith’s example of the role of a linen shirt in eighteenth century Europe, a socially-
adequate shirt would not presumably have cost any less to the poorest person than the richest. 
While poor people may be highly constrained in their spending on things that facilitate their 
inclusion, and so be more socially excluded, that does not mean that their social inclusion needs 
are negligible. Thus, the prevailing justifications for strongly relative poverty measures are hard 
to accept on theoretical grounds.  
Our weakly relative poverty lines relax these assumptions. From a welfarist perspective, 
our measures place a natural upper bound on the weight attached to relative deprivation, namely 
that it cannot matter so much that measured poverty does not fall when all incomes increase by 
the same proportion. From a non-welfarist perspective, we impose a positive lower bound on the 
cost of social inclusion. Our poverty lines are calibrated to a new compilation of national poverty 
lines, drawing on a vast amount of new poverty studies done since the 1980s. A simple, data-
consistent, schedule of relative poverty lines is shown to provide an excellent fit to these data on 
national lines, but with an elasticity that rises from zero to unity, but never reaches unity.  
On implementing our weakly relative poverty lines using almost 700 surveys for 115 
countries we find that there is more relative poverty in the developing world than has been 
thought and that the pace of progress against relative poverty over 1981-2005 is less encouraging 
than that against absolute poverty. We find that 47% of the population of the developing world 
lived in relative poverty in 2005, down from 53% in 1990 and 63% in 1981. This was not a 
sufficient rate of decline in the incidence of poverty to prevent a rise in the number of poor, in 
contrast to our absolute poverty measures that show falling poverty counts in the aggregate. With   19 
economic growth, the relative poverty line tends to rise, and proportionately more as average 
income rises. Both the direct impact on the poverty line and the effect on the responsiveness of 
the poverty rate to economic growth tend to bring down the trend rate of decline in relative 
poverty. Slower progress against relative poverty is thus the “other side of the coin” to success 
against absolute poverty.     20 
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      Figure 1: National poverty lines plotted against mean consumption  
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Table 1: Absolute poverty measures 
 
  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005 
Percentage below poverty line 
  51.9  46.7  41.9  41.7  39.2  34.5  33.7  30.5  25.2 
Of which:                   
East Asia and Pacific  77.7  65.5  54.2  54.7  50.8  36.0  35.5  27.6  16.8 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  12.9  15.3  13.7  11.3  10.1  10.9  10.9  10.7  8.2 
South Asia  59.4  55.6  54.2  51.7  46.9  47.1  44.1  43.8  40.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  53.4  55.8  54.5  57.6  56.9  58.8  58.4  55.0  50.9 
Number of people below poverty line in millions 
  1899.8  1813.8  1722.8  1818.5  1798.6  1657.7  1697.7  1601.1  1373.7 
Of which:                   
East Asia and Pacific  1071.5  947.3  822.4  873.3  845.3  622.3  635.1  506.8  316.2 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  47.1  59.5  56.7  49.6  46.6  53.1  55.3  56.6  45.3 
South Asia  548.3  547.6  569.1  579.2  559.4  594.4  588.9  615.9  595.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  212.3  242.2  258.0  297.5  317.4  355.6  382.7  389.8  388.4 
Note: The table gives the % of the estimated population living in households with consumption per person below $38 per month at 2005 PPP and the number of 
poor by this measure. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Relative poverty lines and measures 
  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005 
Average poverty line ($PPP per person per month) 
  63.52  63.93  63.64  62.34  60.71  62.21  64.09  68.67  75.53 
Of which:                   
East Asia and Pacific  39.81  40.03  40.09  41.47  42.53  44.78  48.05  53.62  60.98 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  140.75  131.90  136.26  119.57  123.13  134.22  136.94  137.31  151.40 
South Asia  39.16  39.49  39.93  41.75  42.52  44.85  45.97  47.71  51.52 
Sub-Saharan Africa  47.49  47.41  45.51  45.43  44.78  45.61  45.74  46.12  46.91 
Percentage below poverty line 
  63.3  58.2  53.1  53.2  50.8  48.8  50.2  49.8  47.4 
Of which:                   
East Asia and Pacific  79.4  67.4  56.2  58.3  55.4  42.9  47.1  44.4  37.7 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  52.5  55.5  50.1  43.3  43.4  48.9  48.6  49.5  45.1 
South Asia  61.6  58.4  57.8  59.0  55.9  60.2  59.0  61.3  63.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  59.0  60.7  59.1  62.0  60.9  63.6  63.0  59.5  55.6 
Number of people below poverty line in millions 
  2318.9  2259.2  2182.8  2320.0  2331.1  2348.9  2527.0  2613.4  2586.6 
Of which:                   
East Asia and Pacific  1095.5  975.3  853.0  930.0  922.5  741.6  842.7  815.6  709.5 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  192.2  216.6  207.7  189.5  200.3  237.0  246.6  262.2  248.1 
South Asia  568.6  575.4  607.6  660.4  665.8  760.7  786.8  861.8  932.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  234.5  263.4  279.9  320.1  339.6  384.8  412.9  421.6  424.2 
Note: The table gives the % of the estimated population living in households with consumption per person below our relative poverty lines (equation 8) and the 
number of poor by this measure. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  